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ABSTRACT
Phishers nowadays rely on a variety of channels, ranging from
old-fashioned emails to instant messages, social networks, and the
phone system (with both calls and text messages), with the goal
of reaching more victims. As a consequence, modern phishing be-
came a multi-faceted, even more pervasive threat that is inherently
more difficult to study than traditional, email-based phishing.
This short paper describes the status of a data collection system
we are developing to capture different aspects of phishing cam-
paigns, with a particular focus on the emerging use of the voice
channel. The general approach is to record inbound calls received
on decoy phone lines, place outbound calls to the same caller iden-
tifiers (when available) and also to telephone numbers obtained
from different sources. Specifically, our system analyzes instant
messages (e.g., automated social engineering attempts) and suspi-
cious emails (e.g., spam, phishing), and extracts telephone num-
bers, URLs and popular words from the content. In addition, users
can voluntarily submit voice phishing (vishing) attempts through
a public website. Extracted telephone numbers, URLs and popu-
lar words will be correlated to recognize campaigns by means of
cross-channel relationships between messages.
1 Introduction
Modern cyber criminals are widely recognized to be well-organized
and profit-driven, as opposed to the reputation-driven underground
which was prevalent years ago [2]. As a part of their arsenal,
the miscreants have learned to streamline their campaigns also by
leveraging automated social engineering attacks over several chan-
nels including emails, instant messaging, social networks [3], and
the phone system (with both calls and text messages), with the com-
mon goal of expanding their “business” beyond email users. How-
ever, traditional a-lá-Mitnick scams are based on pure social engi-
neering techniques and, despite their effectiveness, they are rela-
tively slow. To make this a viable business, modern scammers have
begun to take advantage of the customers’ familiarity with “new
technologies” such as Internet-based telephony, text-messages [4],
and automated telephone services. Another example is the use
of instant messaging (e.g., Windows Live Messenger, Skype, the
FaceBook chat), which involves some form of conversation with
computer programs that leverages natural language processing and
artificial intelligence techniques to mimic a real person [6].
A particular variant of phishing, known as vishing (i.e., voice
phishing), was popular in the U.S. in 2006–2009 [5], and is now
slowly gaining ground in Europe. Notably, an experiment con-
ducted in 2010 by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Jus-
tice Research Institute revealed that the 25.9% of Italians (on a sam-
ple comprising 800 randomly-selected citizens) were successfully
tricked by phone scammers. In a previous work [7] we analyzed
this type of scams, based on a selection of about 400 user-submitted
reports, including the caller identifier (e.g., source phone number),
(parts of) the transcribed conversation, general subject of the con-
versation, and spoken language. Besides confirming that vishing
was popular in the U.S. at that time, our experience suggests that
phishers rely on automated responders, and not only on live calls,
with the goal of reaching a broader spectrum of victims. Reports
were filed between 2009 and 2010 through a publicly-available web
site where anyone can submit anonymous reports of vishing.
The system described in [7] focuses solely on vishing and, in
addition, it has two main limitations. First, we trust submitters
and, second, the effectiveness of vishing attacks could not be deter-
mined (evidently, people reporting suspicious calls are less prone
to falling prey to them). To overcome these limitations, we pro-
pose to correlate the evidence on vishing scams with other forms
of phishing. To this end, the new approach is to collect suspicious
emails from spam-traps, instant messages from dedicated honey-
pots (e.g., based on myMSNhoneypot [1]) and content published by
spammers on social networks (leveraging the @spamdetector ser-
vice [9]). Our approach is content-driven. In particular, the first
goal is to thoroughly quantify the popularity of voice-based scams.
Secondly, we want to understand whether there are relationships
between voice-based campaigns and text-based campaigns. Third,
we strive to recognize evidence that suggest the use of social engi-
neering techniques.
2 System overview
Our system has four modules, each tackling a different aspect of
phishing. The phone module is an automated phone bot that places
outbound calls, receives inbound ones, and records resulting con-
versations. The email module is a spam bot that receives spam
and phishing email messages, and IM module is an instant mes-
saging honeypot that collects unsolicited chat messages. The so-
cial network module will be implemented as a web crawler that to
monitor suspicious accounts, known for sending spam (according
to @spamdetector).
2.1 Text processing and correlation
The collected corpus (e.g., body of email messages, transcribed
phone conversations, instant messages) is stored and analyzed us-
ing simple natural language processing techniques to extract pop-
ular sentences and words. Specifically, the stemming algorithm
described in [8] is first applied to reduce words to stems. Secondly,
stop words such as “the”, “an”, “this” are removed.
Regular expressions are then used to extract (possibly new) phone
numbers and URLs. The former, core part of our approach, are
sent to the phone module, while the latter will be shared for ex-
ternal analysis. Numbers, URLs and popular stems are used as a
preliminary set of features to correlate messages across channels
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Figure 1: Overview of the dataflow of our collection system.
and find groups of different campaigns. Since shortened URLs are
often used to evade filters (or simply to trick users), these are first
resolved with the long-shore.com API, a service that mimics a
real browser and records the redirection chain from a short URL
to the target URL. Instead of the URL itself, the whole chain is
retained and used as a similarity feature: it is indeed common for
spammers to use multiple redirections to the same phishing site, to
increase the lifespan of their campaigns.
2.2 Phone channel
The core of our collection system is divided into two sub-modules,
both based on Asterisk. The caller sub-module periodically calls
a feed of numbers. Whenever someone answers, a pre-recorded
prompt mimics a hypothetical victim, supposedly tricked by the
reverse vishing scam (e.g., “Hi, this is Bob, I received your email
and I am curious to know more about it” ) and waits for 30 seconds.
The resulting audio is recorded along with simple metadata such
as date, time, and number. The recorder module is leveraged to
answer inbound calls on a series of decoy numbers that we plan to
make available deliberately on social network profiles, blog posts
and forums.
Audio recorded from both inbound and outbound calls is retained
in a database, and is transcribed using the Sphinx speech-to-text
engine. The resulting text, if any, is then processed as described
above.
2.3 Email channel
This module is implemented as a distributed client, meant to be
deployed at ISPs and other institutions (e.g., universities and re-
search centers). The client analyzes spam databases and collects
emails that are likely to contain a phone number. At the moment,
attachments that may contain scanned documents (used by scam-
mers that attempt to evade basic filters) are not considered. Found
messages are sent back to a bot, publicly reachable via SMTP at
bot@phonephishing.info. Contributors are invited to submit sus-
picious emails directly to this address.
2.4 Instant messaging channel
This module is implemented as a set of instant messaging accounts
(i.e., Yahoo! Messenger, Windows Live Messenger and Google
Talk), all registered on myMSNhoneypot, a honeypot that monitors
such accounts for any activity. Since the accounts all have empty
buddy lists, any message or friendship request received on those
accounts is considered as malicious. Only instant messages that
contain phone numbers are retained.
3 Collected data
As of February 2011, the email module has been working for 2
months, and the phone module is ready for deployment. To boot-
strap the system, we gathered data from the email module and from
phonephishing.info. We selected 551 vishing reports out from
about a thousand of reports submitted by users in the first two years
of activity. Discarded reports are mostly about telemarketing calls.
This may appear a limited amount of data, but it must be considered
that people typically do not voluntarily give out information, espe-
cially when falling victims. Nevertheless, this module collected
532 unique numbers. We observed that a good share of the vishers
resort to automated responders. In such calls, popular terms such as
“press”, “credit”, “account”, are more frequent on automated calls
with respect to calls made by live operators.
The email module has been processing spam emails provided
from an ISP located in Southern California. In less than one month,
the system selected 16,750 emails containing at least one telephone
number, which amount to the 0.047% of the total number of spam
emails collected by the ISP. Overall, this module collected 152
unique phone numbers as the time of writing.
With the support of a large telecommunication provider, the phone
module is being deployed on a number of DSL lines to begin call-
ing our initial list of 685 numbers.
4 Limitations and technical challenges
The main limitation of our approach lies in phone numbers col-
lected by user-submitted reports, that could be very well spoofed
identifiers. In fact, based on a few probing calls we placed manu-
ally, a good share of numbers (a rough 10%) are either deactivated
or non-existing; unfortunately, it is difficult if not impossible to tell
spoofed, blacklisted or deactivated numbers apart.
The main technical challenge of our system lies in the phone
module. Specifically, even accurate speech-to-text software are far
from being able of transcribing an entire conversation. We plan to
workaround this obstacle by recognizing only a finite set of known
(key)words extracted from reverse-vishing emails.
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